The US District Court case was appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and a decision was filed in 1987 affirming the district court’s declaratory judgement and affirming but modifying the injunctive relief, creating a new permanent injunction that read, “William Brock and his successors in office are enjoined to cease refusing to enforce the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act, Pub.L. 97-470, 96 Stat. 2583 (1983), codified as 20 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., as to recruiting, soliciting, hiring, employing, furnishing or transporting any migrant or seasonal worker for all predominantly manual forestry work, including but not limited to tree planting, brush clearing, precommercial tree thinning and forest fire fighting.” 

Judge Farris, in his majority opinion, presented a detailed rationale, complete with citations for several prior cases, explaining the removal of the language requiring the Secretary to amend departmental regulations, re-write the departmental Coordinated Enforcement Plan, and notify others of the court's ruling. He did not, however, present any rationale explaining the addition of the words “forest fire fighting”. This supports the conclusion that Judge Farris interpreted the original injunctive relief to include all of the tasks that forestry workers may do, which includes forest fire fighting. If instead, Judge Farris intended to expand the scope of the district court’s decision to require the Secretary of Labor to enforce the MSPA on all wildland firefighters, even outside of the commercial forestry industry, it would be expected that there would also have been an equally detailed rationale for that modification.

Applicability to Wildland Fire 

Fact Sheet #63 – Not Applicable 

29 CFR 500 – Not Applicable 

29 USC 1801 et seq. – Not Applicable 

Bresgal V. Brock – US District Court Oregon – Not Part of Trial 

Bresgal V. Brock – 9th Circuit Court of Appeals – Not Discussed 

Additionally, Judge Farris makes the following statements in his majority opinion showing his clear and consistent understanding that the declaratory judgment and the injunctive relief in the district court’s decision applied only to the commercial forestry industry.  

“In the forestry business, as in more conventional agricultural industries, independent labor contractors often act as middlemen, hiring and transporting migrant workers for seasonal labor on land owned by others.”

“The Secretary of Labor has taken the position that the Act does not apply to commercial forestry workers. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the Act applies to forestry workers and an injunction requiring the Secretary of Labor to enforce it in the industry.”

“Does the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act apply to migrant and seasonal commercial forestry workers?”

“We recognize that forestry workers are not commonly viewed as agricultural workers. Our examination of the underlying purposes of the Act, however, compel our conclusion that forestry workers who raise trees as a crop for harvest are engaged in "agricultural employment" for purposes of the Act.”

“The conditions that Congress addressed in the Act, and the persons protected, are the same in the forestry industry as in more conventional agricultural industries.”

“Our interpretation of the Act is supported by the Legislative history. Congress expressly stated its understanding that farm labor contractors in the forestry business are within the Act's coverage.”

“The Senate and House reports do not specify Congress' purpose in the amendment, but emphasize the nature and magnitude of the problem with labor contractors generally. Both reports note that the primary purpose of the amendment was to provide "coverage to all aspect of commerce in agriculture."”

“The district court ordered the Secretary to enforce the Act in the forestry industry.”

“Here, a major class of persons that will be affected by our ruling — labor contractors operating in the forestry business — is not before the court.”

“Because the Secretary is a party to this suit, an injunction against him requiring enforcement of the Act as to the forestry-related activities identified in the district court's declaratory judgment is appropriate."

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Anderson clearly shares the same understanding of the scope with which the decision is to be applied with the following statement. 

“In common parlance, the commercial logging industry is not ordinarily thought to be an agricultural industry nor are commercial loggers and forestry workers considered to be agricultural laborers. Nor do I believe that the legislative intent and history support the majority view. From 1974 to the present, the crucial provisions and language of the Act have remained the same. The Act was thoroughly reviewed by Congress in 1983, yet no changes were made to extend the Act to commercial forestry and logging operations.”